The title of my chapter alludes to Gayatri C. Spivak’s collection of essays called Outside in the Teaching Machine. Spivak’s paradoxical title refers specifically to the position occupied by the “postcolonial” critic or teacher in Western academic institutions, a position simultaneously inside and outside the teaching apparatus. For Spivak, marking the strange doubleness of this position—its status within hegemonic cultural institutions as a perpetual outside—demonstrates a commitment to “persistent critique” not only of the “postcolonial” critic’s own position but also of the discipline more generally (Spivak 1993, p. 61).

Her choice of the word “machine” as a metonym for “apparatus” or “institution” immediately brings to mind the usage of the term by French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, though Spivak herself does not establish this connection. When Deleuze and Guattari use the term “machine,” they do not necessarily imply a mechanical or technological object or construction. A “machine” can be understood as a network of relations or an assemblage of forces (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). There are many different kinds of machines that constitute a variety of different effects, which Deleuze and Guattari talk about in terms of territoriality. For example, the state apparatus, as one of the most rigid and predominant forms of political organization in the modern world, is linked to an “overcoding” or “reterritorializing” machine (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 448–460). It limits potential connections and alternative forms from taking shape within a given space because it is constantly coding people, places, and institutions in ways that are aligned with the worldwide machine of global capitalism. However, a “war machine,” in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense, is understood as a “deterриториализирующий” machine that betrays the state apparatus in one way or another. It does not refer to a literal state of war or to a war-making machine in the sense of a military–industrial complex; though certainly, as I will argue in this chapter, wars may be assembled with war machines (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). To return to Spivak’s notion of the “outside,” a war machine is that which is exterior to the state but which simultaneously reveals the contingency of the state’s interiority.

I would like to demonstrate the applicability of Deleuze and Guattari’s model of the war machine to the Gulf State of Kuwait. First, I will analyze the various ways in which Kuwait as a nation-state organizes its sense of citizenship and national identity in terms of interiority. Second, I will explore how the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 deterриториализировал the nation-state in more ways than one, as well as what effects this deterриториализация had on the
carefully constructed Kuwaiti inside. Third, I will examine the global outside, call it the “new world order” or global capitalism, in relation to Kuwait’s inside. My argument will be that the war machine laid bare during the Iraqi invasion has been quickly reterritorialized by the state apparatus, though it has had some transformative effects when it comes to Kuwaiti citizens. If we take Spivak at her word, then this attempt to make the outside invisible from within becomes part of the process of accommodating and perpetuating a non-egalitarian status quo. Without an acknowledgment of an outside in the nation machine, “persistent critique,” and the kinds of social, political, and economic transformations it enables, becomes impossible—something neither Kuwait nor any other state in the global machine can afford.

As Anh Nga Longva points out in her study *Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait*, there are generally three broad categorical dichotomies into which the population of Kuwait is divided. They are, in order of importance: Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti, Arab/non-Arab, and Muslim/non-Muslim (Longva, 1997). The first term in each of these oppositions is the one most preferred (and preference here translates primarily into access to social rights—that is, the right to social benefits like free education, health care, housing, etc.—and only secondarily into access to political rights—that is, the right to vote, run for parliament, etc.). But these simple oppositions, which seem clearly demarcated—either you are or you are not a Kuwaiti, Arab, or Muslim—are not actually that easy to decipher. This opacity can best be illustrated by way of the Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti dichotomy.

Who is a Kuwaiti? According to the Nationality Law of 1959, a true Kuwaiti is descended from men who had settled in Kuwait before and up to 1920. Citizenship, therefore, belongs only to the children of these men. Naturalization is possible, although it has become more and more restricted over the years (Russell, 1988). Furthermore, until 1994, naturalized citizens did not have the same political rights as “original” citizens—they could not vote or run for parliament until 30 years after naturalization. Since 1994, this restriction has been modified. Now, naturalized citizens can vote 20 instead of 30 years after naturalization, and male descendants of naturalized fathers can vote and run for office without waiting at all. Although this modification has broadened the electorate from 12% in 1992 to about 15% in 1996 and 1999, it has not done away with the classificatory system altogether, since newly naturalized citizens still can’t vote or run for office for 20 years (Ghabra, 1994; *Kuwait Times*, 1999; Sadowski, 1997).

Kuwaiti women, like newly naturalized citizens, are not quite as Kuwaiti as the first level or original male citizens. This discrimination against women manifests itself in numerous ways, the most obvious being lack of political rights. This unconstitutional, discriminatory policy is now under revision since the Amir, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, shocked the populace on 16 May 1999 by decreeing that women would be able to vote and run for office beginning in 2003. This possible modification in the citizen status of women notwithstanding, other kinds of unequal treatment remain firmly in place. For example, women married to non-Kuwaiti men lose some of their social privileges, their husbands are not granted citizenship, and the children of these couples cannot attain citizenship, even if they are born and spend their whole lives in Kuwait. In contrast, regardless of whom they marry, Kuwaiti men never
lose their social privileges, their non-Kuwaiti wives can be naturalized, and their children are automatically Kuwaiti citizens, with all the social benefits citizenship entails (al-Rahmani, 1996).

A third element that complicates and blurs the Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti opposition are the bidoon, or those “without citizenship.” Their description would seem straightforward enough: as non-citizens, they should be automatically relegated to the non-Kuwaiti camp. However, before the Iraqi invasion and Kuwait’s subsequent liberation, the bidoon occupied what might best be described as a third level of citizenship. The bidoon consist primarily of nomads who did not register with authorities at the time the 1959 Nationality Law came into effect. The bidoon also consist of mercenaries from Iraq, Syria, and Jordan who destroyed their identification papers in order to enjoy some of the benefits—like free health care and education—of Kuwait’s bidoon. Until 1989, the bidoon had been counted as Kuwaiti in the national censuses, which demonstrates how, even officially, the status of the bidoon as non-citizens was not absolutely clear. Even more significantly, the national army and police force was comprised, in large part, of the bidoon. Ironically, this meant that it was primarily the stateless who were in charge of defending the state. Before the war, Kuwait’s population included approximately 200,000 bidoon (Longva, 1997).

Another dichotomy within the classification of Kuwaiti identity is the religiously and ethnically inflected Sunni/Shi’a opposition. Many of the Shi’a were second level or naturalized citizens who migrated to Kuwait from Iran. Historically, tensions have existed between Sunni and Shi’a Kuwaitis. During the 1980s, with the Iraq–Iran war in full swing and fearing related internal security problems, the Kuwaiti government started to demote or remove Shi’a officials from important military and police posts. Job opportunities started to become more scarce for the Shi’a population. In addition, surveillance in Shi’a neighborhoods increased with restrictions being placed on their religious and communal practices (Crystal, 1990). Deportations of Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti Shi’a also increased, intensifying the already sharp opposition between the two Muslim sects. During the invasion—with the demonstration of loyalty by the Shi’a population in Kuwait—and after liberation—with official discriminatory practices removed—this opposition has become less distinct.

Given these secondary oppositions within the overarching Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti dichotomy, the “outside” within the classificatory term “Kuwaiti” can be said to be composed of naturalized or second level citizens, women, the bidoon, and the Shi’a. What exactly does this imply from the perspective of the terminology introduced at the beginning of this paper? As Deleuze and Guattari argue, the main objective of any state apparatus is to organize social elements in ways that serve its own effectivity and functionality. This is best achieved through a process of segmentation, which depends on a “binary machine.” Deleuze describes the “binary machine” as a dichotomic force, which organizes life into “either/or” classifications (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987, p. 128). Within the category of Kuwaiti nationality, Kuwait’s binary machine segments on the basis of ancestry, gender, citizenship, and religion. A binary machine is effective in terms of state power because it limits our understanding of what the state can be. It creates an inside, a sense of absolute identity and homogeneity. Paradoxically, of course, this sense of interiority is contingent upon those “outside” elements whose indispensability to this sense of interiority is conveniently
In other words, a “true” Kuwaiti can only be true if, in one way or another, the second level Kuwaitis, women, the *bidoon*, and the Shi’a are not. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the kind of exteriority typified by second level Kuwaitis, women, the *bidoon*, and the Shi’a forms a “war machine” (1987). A war machine coexists with the state apparatus and is in constant competition with it. In fact, the war machine impedes the formation of the state because it implicitly questions the sovereignty of the state’s identic boundaries. Yet, more often than not, this radical aspect of the war machine is neutralized or “reterritorialized,” as was certainly the case in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion. This circumscription of the war machine’s anti-hierarchizing effect was achieved in a number of different ways. For example, in the case of second level citizens, except for political rights, they enjoyed every other social privilege of “original” Kuwaitis—and these privileges were and continue to be impressive by any standard. While Kuwait certainly has had a long history of democratic participation, this history has been fraught with enough suspensions and limitations that the practice of political rights has often been limited for everyone, first level citizens included. Blurring the distinction between first and second level citizens reduced the visibility of the latter’s marginal status *vis-à-vis* the state’s interior. The same process occurred with the Shi’a and with women, though women were further controlled by gendered religious and other traditional ideologies. The *bidoon* were neutralized by ongoing promises of possible citizenship, jobs, free housing, and access to health care and education.

However, the most efficient way in which the war machine, comprised of second level citizens, women, the *bidoon*, and the Shi’a, was reterritorialized before the Iraqi invasion was through the binary machine that segmented the population into Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. This opposition was a repetition of the dichotomous form established within citizenship writ large. Its effect was to homogenize the heterogeneity of the Kuwaiti population by constructing a common “outside” all Kuwaitis could identify. Any progressive potential the war machine might have had was thereby minimized by way of its erasure. That is to say, in the face of a definite, non-Kuwaiti outside, the war machine within Kuwaitiness itself became less visible and therefore less immediately effective.

Who, then, is a non-Kuwaiti? The non-Kuwaitis consist primarily of immigrant workers. Since the first shipment of oil in 1946, Kuwait has been a nation of immigrant labor. The labor force in Kuwait is made up of workers mostly from Arab countries and South and East Asia, but also from Europe, America, and Africa (al-Moosa and McLachlan, 1985). In 1990, 73.5% of the population was non-Kuwaiti (Longva, 1997). Longva has brilliantly discussed the sponsorship system or *kafala*—introduced legally in 1975—as the most significant way in which the uneven distribution of power between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis is institutionalized. *Kafala* is the system whereby any non-Kuwaiti entering Kuwait must be sponsored by a Kuwaiti man or woman. Legally, sponsorship entails the Kuwaiti sponsor signing a form issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor affirming that the non-Kuwaiti works for him or her; that any change in this contract will be reported to the Immigration Department; and that the sponsor will pay for the worker’s repatriation once the contract ends (Longva, 1997). *Kafala* is something that all Kuwaitis, regardless of citizenship level, gender, or religion, share. It creates a structural opposition between Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti that goes beyond the typical opposition between nationals and
non-nationals of most other countries. By controlling labor movement within the country, by holding passports, and by threatening, if not actually carrying out, deportation, the sponsor wields an unusual degree of power over the sponsored (Longva, 1997). Of course, it is argued that these are security measures necessary in a state as small as Kuwait. Nonetheless, the effect of the kafala system, regardless of how it is legitimated, remains the same: it segments the population into Kuwaitis, as those who have sponsorship power, and non-Kuwaitis, as those who don’t.

Despite this seemingly straightforward legal division, just as the classification of the Kuwaiti is not as clear as it seems, so too is the case of the non-Kuwaiti. The bidoon, of course, sit on the edge of this dichotomy, as I’ve already mentioned. However, I would argue that it is the Palestinian community that lived and worked in Kuwait before the invasion that problematizes the Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti opposition more than any other non-Kuwaiti group. First of all, in terms of the Arab/non-Arab dichotomy that Longva sets up, Palestinians were, for decades after 1948, at the top of the most preferred Arab list, which translated into better wages, schooling, and economic and ideological support. But preferential treatment does not transgress the Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti opposition in the least. In fact, it reinforces it by consolidating Kuwaiti identity as “generous,” “caring,” and “filial” over and against others identified as “needy”—something the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) also does in abundance.13 This is not to detract from the positive effects of Kuwaiti generosity; it is instead to read that generosity from the perspective of the self-regulating nation machine. Palestinians, who historically have contributed indispensably to the development and growth of Kuwait as a nation-state, nonetheless remained unmistakably outside its demarcated borders. While this exclusion might have made sense economically, legally, or even politically, effectively it was completely inadequate, as the outcome of the invasion would amply demonstrate.

Most of the Palestinians in Kuwait, unlike the other Arab and non-Arab nationals working and living in the country, had nowhere else to go. By 1990, the Palestinian community in Kuwait numbered approximately 380,000 (Ghabra, 1997). Many of those carrying passports or laissez-passers from other countries had hardly ever, in fact, lived anywhere other than Kuwait (Ghabra, 1987; Longva, 1997). However, as Shafeeq Ghabra points out, “[T] he majority of the middle class and poorer Palestinians felt alienated as a result of the restrictions introduced during the 1980s. Such feelings of resentment toward the system of control, as well as feelings of attachment to Kuwait, were most intense among the newer generations of Palestinians born and raised there. Most of them had lived in no other country than Kuwait” (1997, p. 327). Most Kuwaitis felt and continue to feel that a fair exchange dictated their relations with the Palestinians and other migrant communities as well: money in exchange for work for a set period of time.14 However, as Ghabra and others have demonstrated, the singularity of the Palestinian experience meant that this simple equivalency could not be made. While no non-Kuwaiti can enjoy retirement benefits in Kuwait, even if they spend their entire lives working in the country, Palestinians faced, and continue to face, the added challenge of not having anywhere to go after retirement (Ghabra, 1987; Longva, 1997). While Palestinians could work in Kuwait in exchange for money, they could not, in fact, do it only for a set period
of time. Restricting naturalization processes, even for Palestinians born and bred in Kuwait, and using Palestinians as a distinct outside to Kuwait’s inside made it impossible for the Palestinian community to develop the kind of loyalty most Kuwaitis found lacking in it during the Iraqi invasion. By adopting a “siege mentality” developed from constant outside threats to its borders, as well as from being outnumbered by foreigners within its own borders since 1965, Kuwait threw out the potential of a heterogeneous and dynamic nation-state in the name of national security and homogeneity (Assiri, 1990, p. 129; 1996, p. 145).

Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, this dichotomized, territorialized outside within national boundaries constructed what Deleuze, following Spinoza, would characterize as a “bad” affective orientation based on “inadequate ideas.” Briefly, affects are “bad”—in Nietzsche’s sense of the base or the one-dimensional—if they are based on a misunderstanding or a misrecognition of the material and formal conditions of existence (Deleuze, 1988; Nietzsche, 1990). These bad affects (or reactive feelings) are coextensive with an idea that may “indicate” something about our position in the world without really “explaining” the actual material coordinates of our existence (Deleuze, 1988). The problem with bad affects based on inadequate ideas is that they enable all kinds of restrictive forms of social, political, and economic organization, since these forms of organization are felt to be inevitable and true at the corporeal level, often even by those who suffer within them. Bad affects make active transformations much more difficult to legitimate and, thus, to perform. Bad affects are part and parcel of a binary machine which segments and territorializes the state in ways that tend, on the one hand, to obfuscate potential alliances amongst the very groups that are officially held in opposition and, on the other, to limit the general sense of alternative forms the future might take. Bad affects hinder the deterritorializing possibilities of the war machine which, as I will demonstrate, then hinders the development of any affective capacity to recognize global capitalism as the definitive and dividing “outside” within. Capital process, understood in Louis Althusser’s relational and structural sense, produces and circulates inadequate ideas that become coextensive with the very affects of those who receive these ideas. The more widespread the reception of these inadequacies becomes, the more people’s reactive affects themselves contribute to the capital process that was their origin.

From the perspective of Kuwait, the neutralization of the war machine is an example of a situation brought on by a widespread feeling of defensiveness coextensive with an inadequate understanding of citizenship and global relations. As I’ve explained, the war machine got reappropriated by a binary machine that segmented the population into a broader dichotomy—Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti—which seemed much less structurally threatening. However, as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait made clear, this broader division would crack up the internal structure much more powerfully than might have been the case had the smaller divisions been more acknowledged. Had those who comprised the pre-invasion war machine sensed their own shared marginality, they would far more likely have been sensitive to the marginalization experienced by Palestinians and other migrants working within their borders. Shared marginalization might have formed a basis for Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti alliances that were otherwise, apart from unequal economic partnerships, largely non-existent. Instead, bad affects based on the inadequate idea that citizenship is the only way national
identity can be embodied are what dominated the Kuwaiti population before the invasion.

In certain ways, the Iraqi invasion laid bare Kuwait’s war machine. Ironically, it did this by initially reinforcing the homogeneous image of Kuwaiti nationality that the state itself had tried to disseminate before the invasion. Second level Kuwaitis, women, the *bidoon*, the Shi’as, and first level Kuwaiti men alike were all equally subject to Iraqi power. The invasion performed two kinds of deterritorializations. Literally, of course, Kuwait’s borders were overrun by Iraqi troops. In this sense, Kuwait was deterritorialized by a power which did not only come from the outside but was actually attempting to destroy the notion of a Kuwaiti outside by annihilating Kuwait itself. In Deleuze and Guattari’s sense, however, deterritorialization occurred in a much more subtle way. All of the identic stratifications among Kuwaiti’s which had been so carefully constructed (and carefully disguised) before the invasion were instantly destroyed by the Iraqis, whose invading forces did not distinguish between first and second level Kuwaitis or Sunni and Shi’a Kuwaitis. Experiencing the same treatment at the hands of a different kind of “outside” made the institutionalized differences between Kuwaitis simultaneously less meaningful and more visible, both to the marginalized and to those doing the marginalizing. What the war machine might have accomplished over time, the invasion accomplished in one fell swoop.

The effects of this deterritorialization are ongoing. Discrimination against certain kinds of Kuwaitis is finally being addressed and members of the war machine are thus becoming more visible. As I mentioned earlier, some of the restrictions against second level citizens have been lifted. The Shi’a population is no longer discriminated against officially. Women’s political rights are currently under debate. The precarious status of the *bidoon* has been acknowledged as an issue and has been in the foreground of Kuwaiti politics since liberation. In Deleuze’s Spinozist terms, we might say that there is now a much more adequate understanding of citizenship in Kuwait. However, from the perspective of the larger Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti opposition, the binary machine remains as firmly in place today as it ever was before the invasion. The relations amongst Kuwaitis, which *had* been based on an inadequate idea of citizenship, are changing. The reactive affects of the Kuwaiti people are becoming more active with regards to themselves. And yet, the same cannot be said about their relations with non-Kuwaitis in Kuwait.

Because non-Kuwaitis suffered under the Iraqi invasion in ways similar to, though not identical with, the Kuwaitis, the deterritorializing effects of the war could have transformatively affected the status of Kuwait’s non-Kuwaiti outsiders—the *bidoon*, migrant workers generally, and the Palestinians specifically—just as it affected the outsiders within the Kuwaiti classification system. This did not happen precisely because of the way the population was divided before the invasion and also because of the way these divisions had been naturalized. While the *bidoon*’s status is certainly under investigation, the “solution” that is being sought continues to operate within the inadequate, pre-invasion “inside/outside” opposition. This means that the solution will undoubtedly do nothing to change the population’s conception of what it could mean to be a Kuwaiti. In fact, after liberation, the government immediately tried to clarify the ambiguous status of the *bidoon*. No longer were they to be called those “without citizen-
ship,” a classification which leaves some room for the possibility of eventually attaining citizenship. Instead, the bidoon were to be called “illegal residents” (al-Mutairi, 1994). This shift in designation erases the history of the bidoon as members of the Kuwaiti population and places them firmly on the non-Kuwaiti side. Once again, fears about outside, and now specifically Iraqi, infiltration continue to inform policy regarding the bidoon and all other non-Kuwaitis. Citizenship laws which are becoming more flexible toward those who are already officially “Kuwaiti” are being reinforced against those who might wish to become part of that group.

The so-called solution by June 2000 will be reached by investigating each bidoon’s case on an individual basis, naturalizing those who can prove that they fulfill naturalization requirements, using DNA tests to prove ties to Kuwaiti relatives, and allowing those who disclose hidden identity papers to sponsor themselves for five years (Arab Times, 1999b; al-Din, 1999). Giving some bidoon the right to sponsor themselves seems to reintroduce the old ambiguity that existed between Kuwaitis and the bidoon before the war, since the right of kafala is one of the defining legal distinctions between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. However, unlike in the past, the outsider status of the bidoon is clear since even those with the right to sponsor themselves will now have non-Kuwaiti identity papers. Their right to kafala is qualitatively distinct from the Kuwaitis’ right to kafala. These newly legalized residents, like most other migrant workers, will now be able to fulfill the “set period of time” element of the labor for wage exchange between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. Once the self-sponsorship period ends, there will be somewhere for them to be sent back to. From a Deleuzian perspective, if all goes according to plan and “bidoon” as a classificatory term is eliminated altogether, the potential it once had as a deterritorializing force against a homogenized, often oppressive, understanding of citizenship in Kuwait will be utterly reterritorialized.

While there have been changes in the nationalities of migrant workers (more Asians, less Arabs; more Egyptians, less Palestinians), in general, their outsider status remains unchanged (Cordesman, 1997; Crystal, 1992; Longva, 1997). The fairness of this system continues to be legitimated in terms of the wages for work exchange, while opportunities for naturalization, even for long-term residents, remain slim. The sponsorship system continues and the binary opposition it constructs (Kuwaitis versus non-Kuwaitis) is still very much in effect. In fact, the experience of the invasion and occupation shared by Kuwaitis has perhaps made the opposition even more unyielding. Longva suggests that “this traumatic event has considerably strengthened [Kuwaitis’] national identity and brought the process of ‘heart-and-mind’ nation-building very much forward” (1997, p. 244). This can certainly be read as a positive development; yet the more often ignored negative effects of this identic consolidation need also to be acknowledged and addressed.

After the liberation of Kuwait, the possibility that aiming toward the status quo ante might not, in fact, be the best way to proceed was suggested in a number of ways. Before the invasion, the ratio of the Kuwaiti to non-Kuwait population was 26.5% to 73.5% (Assiri, 1996). Because the invasion had displaced the migrant population so completely, the state was suddenly in a position to reorganize its policies in ways that could prevent such an uneven population ratio from recurring. Sharon Stanton Russell and Muhammed Ali
al-Ramadhan do a thorough job of examining Kuwait’s migration policy since the Gulf crisis. In short, the government wanted to introduce policies that would decrease Kuwaiti dependence on foreign labor by increasing the Kuwaiti labor force’s productivity and participation, by restricting migrant labor, and by reducing migrant workers’ terms of residency (Russell and al-Ramadhan, 1994). However, by 1997, non-Kuwaiti’s formed 65.38% of the population with Kuwaitis forming only 34.62% (Kuwait Ministry of Planning, 1999). I would argue that the apparent failure of these policies has had much to do with the ways in which Kuwaiti identity and self-definition relied upon the non-Kuwaiti outside within its own borders before the invasion. Even though the opportunity for a different way of claiming and defining national identity might have become possible after the invasion, this potential was immediately reterritorialized by government policy that followed pre-invasion patterns. The inadequate notion that all non-Kuwaitis do not actually belong in Kuwait and are performing a service for which they are being paid remains strong today. Amongst Kuwaitis, this perpetuates a sense of their “natural” entitlement to social services and privileges which, in turn, reinforces the very dependency on foreign labor the state had hoped to reduce after liberation (Cordesman, 1997).

The tragic case of Kuwait’s Palestinian community is the best illustration of what bad affects—understood here in terms of one-dimensionality or inflexibility—can lead to. The resentment and alienation felt by Palestinians over unequal treatment based on and legitimated by their outsider status in Kuwait increased in the 1980s, as Ghabra points out (1997). Their feelings were qualitatively different from those of most other migrant workers in Kuwait because, as I mentioned earlier, they either didn’t have anywhere else to go after Kuwait or else because, for many, Kuwait was the only home they knew. For most Kuwaitis, conditioned to accept the Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti opposition as absolutely legitimate and commonsensical, Palestinian grievances did not warrant serious consideration (Ghabra, 1997). Moreover, with the siege mentality at work, the tendency was to see Palestinians as outsiders wanting a piece of the Kuwaiti pie rather than as productive members of the population who had earned a right to a piece of the pie which was then denied them. All this made the explosive conflict between Kuwaitis and Palestinians during and after the invasion almost inevitable.

In his essay “Palestinians and Kuwaitis: Conflict and Missed Opportunities,” Ghabra has superbly analyzed the actual reaction of Palestinians during the invasion, how this reaction was misrepresented by both political leaders and the media, and how this misrepresentation has had devastating results on both communities. He agrees that there were certainly sympathizers among the Palestinians—those who either bought Saddam Hussein’s rhetoric about confronting Israel or random thugs and looters taking advantage of a chaotic situation. However, he further demonstrates how most members of the community were either protesters (among whose number he includes the 200,000 who fled to Jordan), or bystanders who adopted a wait-and-see attitude, or poorer Palestinians who continued to go to work because they did not have any other means of survival. Ghabra astutely points out that “[t]here were very few statements from the exiled Kuwaiti government calling on the Palestinians not to report to work and to remain calm and cooperate with their Kuwaiti brothers. The Kuwaiti government slipped to a position that considered most Palestinians
in the enemy camp. In fact, communities (Palestinian, Egyptian, Syrian, etc.)
came to be simply categorized in accordance with the position of their govern-
ments. Therefore Palestinians were considered pro-Iraqi regardless of actual
divisions” (1997, p. 335). That this collapsing of leadership into actual com-
munity members was so easy to do for both the Kuwaiti leadership and the
majority of the Kuwaiti population is understandable when we consider how the
population was segmented into Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis before the invasion.

For most Kuwaitis, it seemed perfectly natural that non-Kuwaitis—even those
non-Kuwaitis who were, for all intents and purposes, almost as Kuwaiti as the
Kuwaitis themselves—would betray the state. That most Kuwaitis felt this way
meant that, after liberation, the support offered by Palestinians to Kuwaitis
during the invasion was generally underemphasized, while Palestinian betrayal
was overexaggerated. The outcome of this inadequate understanding of the
relationship between Kuwaitis and Palestinians resulted in devastatingly reac-
tive events immediately after liberation: from arbitrary arrests and unfair trials,
to torture and imprisonment, to expulsions from the country and even murder
(Ghabra, 1997). From a population of about 380,000 in 1990, the Palestinian
population in Kuwait fell to about 30–40,000 after liberation (Ghabra, 1997). Most
Kuwaitis do not seem to feel a sense of loss for a community they had lived with
for about five decades, though the local economy certainly suffers from the loss
of Palestinian spending since, unlike current Asian workers who remit most of
their earnings, most Palestinians spent much of their money in Kuwait (Cordes-
man, 1997). I would argue that this lack of affective sympathy with the
Palestinian community has as much to do with Kuwait’s relationship to the
global outside as it does with the binary structure of its own state apparatus.

I have demonstrated how Kuwait’s state apparatus segments the population,
by way of a binary machine, into the overarching categories of Kuwaiti and
non-Kuwaiti. I have also demonstrated how, after the invasion, the war machine
that always existed alongside this binary machine was brought to the fore-
ground and how it has transformed the understanding of citizenship when it
comes to members of the Kuwaiti population. For the non-Kuwaiti population,
however, the war machine has not had the kind of deterritorializing effect it
could have. This is, of course, partly because, as in any nation-state, non-citizens
in Kuwait constitute a “natural” outside against which Kuwaiti citizenship is
defined (Longva, 1995). In addition, however, the reterritorialization of the
possibility of an expanded citizenship—that is, the possibility of including the
bidoon, long-term migrant workers, or Palestinians—also has to do with Kuwait’s
changing role in the “new world order.”

With an estimated 8.6–9.7% of the world’s oil reserves, Kuwait’s role as an oil
exporting nation-state in the global economy both before and after the Iraqi
invasion remains unchanged (Cordesman, 1997). While Kuwait has always had
relations with Western states, its tie to the United States since the invasion is
arguably the strongest since its tie to Britain as a protectorate from 1899 to
1961. On 19 September 1991, Kuwait signed a 10-year joint defense agreement
with the United States (Cordesman, 1997). This agreement, under which the US
prepositions military equipment in Kuwait and conducts joint military exercises
with Kuwaiti forces, has given the US a strong and visible presence on Kuwaiti
land. Kuwait was and is willing to pay for its needs. It paid $13.5 billion to the
US toward the military cost of the war (Crystal, 1992). The US also secured most
of the lucrative contracts with Kuwait during the rebuilding process after liberation (Crystal, 1992). Today, Kuwait spends about $1907 per capita on military forces. In contrast, Israel spends $1335 per capita, while the US spends $1204 per capita (Cordesman, 1997). Most, though not all, of this spending is on US equipment and arms. As Anthony Cordesman points out, Kuwait tends to purchase from countries for diplomatic and political reasons rather than to fulfill actual military needs (1997).

For Kuwait, linking foreign policy to spending is not new. As Abdul-Reda Assiri argues, once Kuwait started exporting oil, it could use financial means to attain political ends it might not otherwise have managed to achieve because of its small size (1990). Assiri, writing before the invasion, outlines Kuwait’s major national goals as being: “1) political and military security; 2) Arabic ideology and Islamic values; and 3) the ‘mission’ to invest and share the nation’s wealth with less fortunate Arab and Moslem countries” (1990, p. xiv). I would argue that, since the invasion, a major shift has occurred in the second of these goals. Of course, Islamic ideology continues to be central to the customs and traditions of the Kuwaiti population. However, as Longva points out, there has been a shift from “qawmiyya—loyalty to the Arab nation—to \textit{wataniyya}—loyalty to Kuwait” (1995, p. 215). At the level of government policy, this shift has meant that relations with the Arab world are, in many ways, secondary to relations with those who are in a seemingly better position to guarantee national security—namely, the West in general and the US more specifically. While Kuwait may have arguably always been linked in this way to the global “outside,” if to a lesser degree, the invasion has done much to encourage uncritical support of this relationship amongst the general population.

The inadequacy of its relationship to the global outside is directly linked to the inadequacy of Kuwait’s restrictive control of the outside within its own borders. Kuwaitis feel that they need to be protected by the West since neighbors are not to be trusted, just as they feel that naturalization policies must be controlled in order to protect citizens from disloyal outsiders wanting a piece of the Kuwaiti pie. This sensibility is inadequate because it fails to recognize that the “outside” to be feared is precisely the “outside” that is today being catered to: global capitalism. It is understandable that the Iraqis, the Palestinians, or the \textit{bidoon} shoulder the blame for what a much larger and more complex system is responsible. It is, after all, easier to point fingers at Iraqi brutality, Palestinian betrayal, and the \textit{bidoon}’s dishonesty than it is to consider how the war and its aftermath serve the present interests of global capitalism, especially since those interests do not contradict Kuwait’s own \textit{short-term} national interests. In the \textit{long term}, however, this policy, encouraged by widespread Kuwaiti public opinion, may not serve Kuwait’s national interests since it trades the very independence for which it paid dearly for an economic and political dependency even more entrenched than it was before the war.

Kuwait’s relations with the outsiders within its own borders, both before and after the invasion, signal its inadequate grasp of the bigger picture. What might have been different about the outcome of the war had Kuwait encouraged a policy of naturalization and heterogeneity rather than exclusion and segmentation? How might the reaction of Palestinians, both within and outside Kuwait, have been different? How might the reaction of the Arab “masses” have been different? These questions need to be asked because Kuwait is repeating its
policy toward its potential local allies in ways that are even more visible and more generally accepted than before the invasion. By turning local allies into local enemies and by basing this decision on the inadequate notion that outsiders must be kept outside while paradoxically participating in a global capitalism that circumscribes the possibility of anything outside its own logic, Kuwait is limiting its future in a dangerously one-dimensional way.

Kuwait occupies a paradoxical position within the “new world order,” a position not unlike Spivak’s postcolonial critic. Kuwait is centrally enough positioned within the global capitalist order that the West is willing to go to war over it. And yet, as a dependent nation with a very specialized role in the world division of labor as oil producer and expropriator of capital to the centers of world capitalism, Kuwait remains peripheral to or outside that very order (Ismael, 1993). In fact, its insider/outsider status are two sides of the same global capitalist coin. From this position, Kuwait can do one of two things. It can fortify its borders against “outsiders” that work inside those very borders while simultaneously erasing its borders to serve central capitalist interests, as it did before the invasion and continues to do today. Or, it can render its borders flexible when it comes to those who have dedicated their lives to the development of the country while becoming more critical of its own role within the world system. By choosing the latter, Kuwaiti citizens could begin to transform their reactive affects—those based on their inadequate (that is, inflexible) grasp of their country’s position in the global order. That is to say, they could take the kind of deterritorializing process that occurred after the invasion even further instead of allowing the binary machine to reterritorialize the state into its pre-invasion, “inside/outside,” Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti structure. Kuwait is not under siege from its own population nor, hard as it is to believe, from its Arab neighbors. Kuwait is under the same kind of siege all dependent nations are under; though, because of its unusual history of enjoying capital surplus rather than capital shortage, its siege is different in degree than that of most other dependent nation-states (Ismael, 1993). Recognizing how they are really under siege will make it possible for Kuwaitis to move past the kind of defensive exclusions and foreign policy decisions that caused problems before and during the war, toward new political alliances with Arab neighbors that can begin with those Arabs that live within their own borders.

While pan-Arabism has long been declared dead, a new kind of pan-Arabism—a pan-Arabist war machine, which is not to say a war-making machine—is, perhaps, long overdue. Kuwait, given the heterogeneity of its own population, its pivotal role in the world system, as well as its war experience, might just be the most perfectly situated, if the most unlikely, birthplace for this new Arab nationalism. The tendency after the invasion has been to move toward a narrower sense of nationalism, a Kuwaiti rather than Arab nationalism. This move seems commonsensical given the “betrayal” by Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and others. Difficult as it would be to do, however, Kuwaitis must acknowledge their own role in preparing the conditions for this betrayal. Only then will it be possible to forge what are today, sadly, unlikely alliances fueled by a new pan-Arabist ideology. The urgency for this broad nationalism can only be understood within the context of global capitalism. As Neil Lazarus argues, “[I]n the era of transnational capitalism it is only on the basis of ... nationalitarian struggle ... that it is possible to imagine a postcapitalist
world order” (1997, p. 46).\textsuperscript{28} Given the third of Kuwait’s national goals as listed by Assiri—that is, to share its wealth—this postcapitalist world order does not contradict state policy and, therefore, should not be dismissed out of hand (Assiri, 1990).\textsuperscript{29}

Deleuze argues that no state, no matter how centralized, and no global form, not even capitalism itself, is infallible (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987). War machines take advantage of that fallibility. During the invasion and after the war, Kuwait’s war machine—comprised of second level citizens, women, the Shi’a, and some of the bidoon—began to transform the understanding of citizenship in a potentially radical way. This radicality was immediately reterritorialized by reinforcing the Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti opposition, which in turn, reinforces Kuwait’s relationship to the rest of the world. A new pan-Arabist sensibility in Kuwait might be the kind of war machine that could continue to provide a reterritorializing force both within and outside its borders. I believe that this sensibility can start to be developed by reconsidering the logic behind citizenship laws in Kuwait, especially when it comes to non-Kuwaitis. This may seem a minor consideration but, as I have tried to demonstrate, its implications reach far beyond Kuwait’s own borders. That Kuwait is a small country goes without saying. That it has a tremendous amount of oil is common knowledge. But that the conditions exist in Kuwait for the birth of a revamped pan-Arabism which could reorganize Arab–global relations is widely overlooked. In fact, this claim may seem, at best, utopian or, at worst, uninformed. To believe that, however, is to accept the kind of one-dimensional thinking that serves the present interests of capital and their attendant social and political forms best. It is precisely this kind of thinking that, in the long run, will ill-serve Kuwait.

Notes

1. While Spivakherself does not make the connection, Georg M. Gugelberger, in his discussion on testimonial discourse, does: “Outside in the Teaching Machine, the felicitous and Deleuzian title of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s latest book, echoes our [‘third world’ or ‘postcolonial’ critics’] dreams and our failures. We wanted to have it both ways: from within the system we dreamed about being outside with the ‘subaltern’; our words were to reflect the struggles of the oppressed” (p. 2). Gugelberger goes on to talk about testimonial discourse—discourse on the testimonio—as a “detterritorializing war machine” which can subvert or at least call into question hegemonic disciplinary assumptions in the academy. He also demonstrates and warns against the dangers of the “reterritorialization,” co-option, or homogenization of testimonial discourse—something that, he argues, has already happened to the testimonio itself. See Gugelberger (1996).

2. In Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait, a study to which I am much indebted, Anh Nga Longva (1997) applies the notion of “detterritorialization” to discuss Kuwait as a “profoundly disembedded world, in which most of the population were migrants who refused to stay put, and blueprints for living seemed to be curiously \textit{ad hoc}, where the cultural construction of identity and belonging constantly challenged the logic of space and territoriality, and where all that was not affected by physical displacement seemed to be affected by the rush of time, through modernization” (p. 238). For Longva, “detterritorialization” is a state that applies to those who are “‘out of place’: immigrant minorities, labor migrants, refugees, and displaced persons of various diasporas, who gather at the margins and in the interstices of national societies” (pp. 240–241). She concludes that an “anthropology of
...ation” is needed in order to examine the dynamics between “the growing ‘solidification’ of the objective world and the increasing fluctuation of the subjective one” (p. 241). I agree with Longva’s dialectical analysis of the relationship between displaced or disembedded peoples and a world in which nation-state boundaries are becoming more “solidified” or regulated against immigration. However, I disagree with her implicit understanding of “deterritorialization” as a state of being (a being “out of place”). Following Deleuze and Guattari, I will use the notion of “deterritorialization” as a state of becoming; that is to say, as a verb rather than as a noun. Those who Longva says are “out of place”—those she describes as being in a state of deterritorialization—are the very ones who make possible a reconceptualization of the “inside/outside” opposition upon which their “outsider” status is based. In this sense, I am approaching “deterritorialization” as something the so-called “deterritorialized” do “in place” rather than are “out of place.” It should be noted that Longva does not mention Deleuze and Guattari in her discussion of deterritorialization. She follows, instead, Arjun Appadurai’s usage. Appadurai cites Deleuze and Guattari when he uses the term “deterritorialization” as a synonym for “diasporic” and “transnational” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 188). It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Appadurai’s take on deterritorialization and the crisis of the nation-state. However, my use of the term cannot be substituted for “transnational” since I am arguing for a deterritorialization of a rigid sense of nationality without arguing for or believing in the imminent dissolution of national boundaries.

3. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari state that “[t]o the extent that war (with or without the battle) aims for the annihilation or capitulation of enemy forces, the war machine does not necessarily have war as its object…” (p. 417). They go on to argue that the war machine and the state necessarily collide because the aim of the war machine is destratification or dehierarchization while the opposite is true of the state apparatus. The state tries to appropriate the war machine, to control or recode its deterritorializing effects. “[I]t is at one and the same time that the State apparatus appropriates a war machine, that the war machine takes war as its object, and that war becomes subordinated to the aims of the State” (p. 418). This appropriation was especially true in Kuwait where the *bidoon*—nomads or mercenaries “without citizenship” who, as I will argue, form part of the war machine—were controlled or reterritorialized by placement in the army whose object is, in fact, war. It is in this sense, then, that the object of a war machine can be war, but is not necessarily war. My argument is that the deterritorializing effects of the war machine in Kuwait only surfaced as a direct result of the Iraqi invasion. It was not that the object of Kuwait’s war machine was war; it was that Kuwait’s war machine assembled with war in a way that made it effective. This distinction cannot be emphasized enough. See Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 351–423).

4. In 1948, the “originally Kuwaiti” members of the population were defined as the ruling family, permanent residents since 1899, children of Kuwaiti men, and children of Arab or Muslim fathers born in Kuwait. Arabic speakers who had worked and resided in Kuwait for 10 years could be naturalized as could those who had provided “valuable services.” However, with the Nationality Law of 1959, the “original” Kuwaitis became those descended from males established in Kuwait in 1920. Children of Arab or Muslim fathers born in Kuwait were no longer considered Kuwaiti. Naturalization became more restrictive. In 1960, the number of individuals from outside the Gulf that could be naturalized was fixed at 50 per year. Meanwhile, non-Arab applicants had to reside in Kuwait for at least 15 years before their applications were even considered. In 1981, a bill was passed restricting naturalization to Muslims only (see Longva, 1995, pp. 204–205). In 1994, a new decree amended the 1959 law by stating that all children of naturalized persons born after their father acquired Kuwaiti citizenship would be regarded as “originally” Kuwaiti. In 1997, a
decree granted Kuwaiti nationality to the children of martyrs classified as *bidoon* (see United Nations, 1990c, par 15, par 23).

5. Act No. 44 of 1994 adds a paragraph to Article 7 of Amiri Decree No. 15 of 1959 which states that “children whose father was naturalized before their birth are automatically Kuwaiti, and this provision also applies to children born before the Act entered into force” (see United Nations, 1990b, par 19).

6. Since writing this essay, the situation has changed. On 23 November 1999, the Kuwait National Assembly rejected the Amiri decree granting women their full political rights. The rejection had less to do with the issue of women’s rights than with the question of the decree’s legality. Members of the Assembly argued that the issue of women’s rights does not fulfill the criterion of “urgency” required of all decrees issued while parliament is out of session. Once the decree was rejected, a new bill was immediately drafted by five members of parliament which essentially replicated the terms of the Amiri decree in more acceptable form. However, this new bill was also rejected by parliament with 32 votes against, 30 votes in favor, two abstentions, and one absence. These events clearly mark a setback for women in Kuwait. Nonetheless, enough controversy and debate has been generated to ensure that the issue of women’s rights will remain in the foreground of political and social life in Kuwait.


9. As Deleuze (1990) puts it, “the Other [or “outside”] is initially a structure of the perceptual field, without which the entire field could not function as it does” (p. 307). Without an outside or “other” to “true” Kuwaiti identity, that very identity could not function or even exist as such.

10. These social benefits include free health services, free local telephone service, subsidized electricity, water, gasoline, and basic food stuffs. Before the war, non-Kuwaitis also enjoyed these social benefits. In addition, Kuwaitis have access to free education from nursery school to graduate school. They are entitled to family allowances, a marriage allowance, living allowances, free housing, and their employment is guaranteed. Kuwaitis also have the right to sponsorship or *kafala*, which I will soon discuss, and the right to own land. See Longva (1997, pp. 52–53) and Crystal (1992, p. 70).

11. Kuwait’s parliament, the National Assembly, has been dissolved three times by the government since its inauguration in 1963. According to Article 107 of *The Constitution of the State of Kuwait* (1962): “The Amir may dissolve the National Assembly by a decree in which the reasons for dissolution shall be indicated. However, dissolution of the Assembly may not be repeated for the same reasons. In the event of dissolution, elections for the new Assembly shall be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of dissolution. If the elections are not held within the said period the dissolved Assembly shall be restored to its full constitutional authority and shall meet immediately as if the dissolution had not taken place. The Assembly shall then continue functioning until the new Assembly is elected” (p. 23). For various reasons, the National Assembly was dissolved in 1976 and the condition that a new election needed to be held within two months or the previous assembly would be reinstated was suspended by the Amir. Elections were held four years later in 1981. However, in 1986 the Assembly was dissolved once again, primarily because the parliament had forced the resignation of the minister of justice, Salman Duaij al-Sabah. The reasons given for the dissolution of the Assembly were “security concerns, excessive division, and the need for unity in the face of the Gulf War [that is, the Iraq–Iran war]” (Crystal, 1990, p. 105). Again, the condition that new elections be held within two months was suspended. New elections were not
held again until after liberation in 1992. In 1999, the Assembly was dissolved for a third time. However, the Amir immediately declared that new elections would be held within two months and they were. For more on the history of the National Assembly and its crises, see Crystal (1990, pp. 91–93, 103–109); Ghabra (1994); Tabatabai (1985); and Ansari (1992).

12. For example, Haya al-Mughni (1996) demonstrates how shari'a, or Islamic law, is used by some women to legitimate the patriarchal oppression of women generally. That some Kuwaiti women actually oppose their own suffrage demonstrates the power of this ideological stranglehold.

13. Jaqueline S. Ismael (1993) argues that the KFAED actually furthers Kuwait’s integration into the world capitalist system because the projects that are funded generally “1) increase the capacity of receiving nations to supply raw materials to Western markets by funding the importation of technologies of scale, and 2) increase the capacity of recipient regimes to stay in power against popular opposition” (p. 124). For a celebratory look at the KFAED and its projects, see McKinnon (1997). For the role of the KFAED in Kuwait’s foreign policy, see Assiri (1990, pp. 26–27). For some general information about the KFAED, see al-Humaidi (1984).

14. Longva (1997) states that Kuwaitis “had no doubt that all the expatriates were pursuing the same aim: they all wanted money and that was why they were in Kuwait” (p. 155). This, of course, implies that if the Kuwaitis fulfill their part of the deal, the expatriates must fulfill theirs by leaving Kuwait once the deal is done.

15. When I say that bad affects are “based” on inadequate ideas I do not mean to imply “absolute origin” but to suggest, instead, that inadequate ideas and reactive affects are always symptomatic of (as well as coextensive with) each other. Reactive affects may be founded on inadequate ideas. Nonetheless, this “foundation” or “basis” is not singly determinate but is itself derived from other relations.

16. Paul Trembath (1996) examines the coextensivity of affects and capital and argues that the more reactive the affect, the more capitalized the sensibility.

17. Abdul R. JanMohamed and David Lloyd (1990), in their discussion of minority discourse, argue for the efficacy of cultural alliances based on “shared damage.” Because minority groups have all suffered oppression at the hands of dominant society, their shared experience of “damage” can become a way for them to collectivize and work toward cultural empowerment (p. 2). Borrowing from JanMohamed and Lloyd, I am similarly arguing that political alliances might have been forged between, say, Kuwaiti women and Palestinian women on the basis of what I am calling their “shared marginalization.”

18. Of course, one would assume that the Iraqi troops could easily differentiate on the basis of gender. Nonetheless, the active roles played by Kuwaiti women during the invasion and the fact that they suffered under it as much as Kuwaiti men did meant that the legitimacy of their pre-invasion, second-class citizen status was called into question. As Saleh al-Hashem, lawyer and candidate in the October 1992 National Assembly elections, puts it, “When Saddam Hussein came he treated us equally. He did not kill Shi’a or Sunna: he killed Kuwaitis. He did not kill workers or merchants: he killed Kuwaitis. He did not kill men or women: he killed Kuwaitis” (quoted in Tétreault, 1993, p. 276).

19. Still, in 1996, government officials reporting to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights uncritically declared: “Kuwait would like to reaffirm that racial discrimination, in both its traditional and contemporary forms, has never existed in our country” (United Nations, 1999b, par 16; my emphasis). Of course, members of the UN commission have pointed out that “racial discrimination” refers to “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based not only on colour, but also on race, descent or national or ethnic origin” (United Nations, 1999a, par 13). Certainly, according to this broader definition, discrimination has occurred and continues to
occur in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti delegation’s declaration notwithstanding. That changes are being made in Kuwait to remedy some of these discriminatory practices implies that there is at least a kind of acknowledgment of their existence. It is in this sense, then, that the war machine—comprised of those against whom the discrimination is practiced—is becoming more visible than it once was.

20. For a complete analysis of the apparatuses of exclusion, see Longva (1997, pp. 43–147).

21. For example, in the Arab Times (1999b) article “Deadline for Bedouns to ‘Legalise’ Residence,” the Minister of Interior is quoted as saying that over 5135 of the bidoon are considered to be “serious” security risks. This is not very different from the pre-invasion mentality of being under “siege,” as Assiri puts it, from both within and without (Assiri, 1996, p. 145). It is precisely this defensive national stance that I am calling into question in this paper.

22. For more on the issue of Palestinians in Kuwait after liberation, see Lesch (1991b); Middle East Watch (1991); and Amnesty International (1996).

23. For a discussion of the Middle East and the “new world order,” see Bennis and Moushabeck (1993, pp. 217–295). Also, see Clovis Maksoud (1991), who reminds us of the importance of a critical and questioning Arab discourse which should help shape “an internationalist and genuinely ‘new global order’” (p. 180). It is only with such a discourse that the “new world order” will cease to trigger memories of an ‘old imperial order’ and will instead prepare humankind jointly to render the 21st century an era in which the ideal and the real blend in creative accommodation and co-discovery” (p. 180).

24. It was under the rule of Mubarak the Great (1896–1915) that Kuwait turned away from the Ottomans toward the British. In 1899 a secret treaty was signed between Mubarak and the British in which Mubarak agreed not to cede, sell, or lease any Kuwaiti territory to any other power without British consent. The British promised to protect Kuwait against foreign attack. Early British interest in Kuwait stemmed from its strategic position as a port. Britain tended not to interfere with Kuwaiti politics as long as its route to India remained secure (Crystal, 1990). At the 1922 Uqair Conference, however, the British played a decisive role in fixing Kuwait’s borders. According to H. R. P. Dickson, who was present at the conference, “Sir Percy took a red pencil and very carefully drew in on the map of Arabia a boundary line from the Persian Gulf to Jabal ‘Anaizan, close to the Transjordan frontier. This gave Iraq a large area of the territory claimed by Najd. Obviously to placate Ibn Sa’ud, he ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of her territory and gave it to Najd” (quoted in Crystal, 1990, p. 43). With the discovery of oil in 1938, of course, British interests were clear and their local interventions increased. However, British interventions were, as Crystal outlines, largely and successfully resisted by Kuwaiti rulers (1990). Kuwait gained its independence in 1961; and in 1975, the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC)—which had previously been owned by British Petroleum and Gulf Oil, an American company—came under the complete ownership of the Kuwaiti government. For a detailed study of the development of Kuwait as an oil producing economy in the world system, see Ismael (1993, pp. 87–101).

25. Longva (1995) adds that “whereas wataniyya appears right now to stand in contradiction with qawmiyya, the relationship between wataniyya and Islam seems to be of a different order. For many Kuwaitis, increased wataniyya goes hand in hand with an increase in identification with Islam” which corroborates my claim that an emphasis on Islamic values has not changed (p. 215). However, if the outcome of the most recent elections in Kuwait is anything to go by, the tendency to politicize those values is, perhaps, on the wane. For an assessment of the 1999 election, see Kuwait Times (1999); Arab Times (1999a); MacDonald (1999a, b); Waheed (1999); and Mirhaj (1999).

26. By the “dishonesty” of the bidoon I do not refer to any “inherent” characteristic of the
*bidoon* but, instead, to the way they are generally viewed by officials and members of the population as dishonestly hiding their identity papers for profit. While certainly many *bidoon* may be “lying” about their national status, moralizing this decision to hide papers dehistoricizes and decontextualizes the conditions which made these lies necessary for survival. I do not want to imply that all the *bidoon* have an equally legitimate claim to citizenship. In fact, the new procedures are perhaps doing the best they can to remedy what is clearly a complicated problem in as humanitarian a way possible. The point I am trying to make goes beyond case by case solutions, however. It has to do with the general tendency on the part of the Kuwaiti population to view some others as “brutal,” “disloyal,” and “dishonest” outsiders who need to be kept “outside” without examining how brutality, disloyalty, and dishonesty are created in the first place. It is this tendency, this Kuwaiti affect or sensibility, that I believe needs to be critically analyzed.

27. For more on Arab reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing war, see Wilcox et al. (1993); Lesch (1991a); and Bennis and Moushabeck (1991, pp. 173–260).

28. Borrowing the term from Anouar Abdel-Malek and the meaning from Frantz Fanon and others, Lazarus uses “nationalitarian” to refer to “a discourse of representation predicated upon the assumption that it is indeed possible for a movement or alliance or party to ‘speak for the nation’” (p. 45). For Fanon, this broad form of nationalism is in direct opposition to a narrow “bourgeois nationalism” (Lazarus, 1997, p. 38). It is, instead, “a liberationist, anti-imperialist, nationalist internationalism” (p. 39). It is, according to Lazarus, the kind of nationalism to which Edward Said is dedicated in his work (p. 45). It is also, I would argue, the kind of nationalism that should inform a revised pan-Arabism. What this new pan-Arabism could look like and how it would diverge from historical pan-Arabism are the subjects of another essay. However, I should emphasize that the kind of nationalism I envision would absolutely not exclude local citizens of Iranian origin or even Iran itself; nor would it exclude non-Arab citizens of Arabic countries. In this sense, it is more a “regionalism” than an “Arabism” that I am advancing here.

29. Kuwait has a history of pan-Arab nationalism, traces of which can be found in members of political groups like the “Kuwaiti Democratic Forum” that run for parliamentary election today. Ghabra (1991) points out that in the 1960s, “With few exceptions, Kuwaiti associations … continued to be influenced directly and indirectly by the grassroots movements of Arab nationalists. The labor unions, the associations of teachers and students, the Literary Club, and the Independence Club called for Arab unity, total independence from foreign rule, the liberation of Palestine, and a socialist system. Anything less was regarded by the nationalist movements of the time as unacceptable, and the state felt these pressures constantly” (p. 203). See Ghabra (1991) for a study of the various political groups in Kuwait, past and present. Also, see Ghabra (1994) for an analysis of the 1992 parliamentary election in Kuwait which is attentive to the history behind the participants and outcome of that election. For more on Kuwait and Arab nationalism, see Assiri (1990) and Crystal (1990).

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